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Summary
After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the United States faced a
challenge in enlisting the full support of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in
counter-terrorism.  This effort raised short-term policy issues about how to elicit
cooperation and how to address China’s concerns about military action (Operation
Enduring Freedom).  Longer-term questions have concerned whether counter-terrorism
has strategically transformed bilateral relations and whether China’s support has been
valuable and not obtained at the expense of other U.S. interests.  Congress has oversight
over the trend toward closer ties with China as well as a range of policy options.  These
options cover law-enforcement cooperation; designations of terrorist organizations;
release of detained Uighurs; weapons nonproliferation; waivers of sanctions for the 1989
Tiananmen crackdown; the Container Security Initiative (CSI); and military-to-military
contacts.  This report will be updated as warranted.
Aftermath of the 9/11 Attacks
China has seen itself as a victim of terrorist attacks, thought to be committed by some
Muslim extremists (ethnic Uighur separatists) in the northwestern Xinjiang region,
particularly in the 1990s.  There were reports that some Uighur activists received training in
Afghanistan.  China’s concerns appeared to place it in a position to support Washington and
share intelligence after the attacks of September 11, 2001.1  In a message to President Bush
on September 11, PRC ruler Jiang Zemin condemned the terrorist attacks and offered
condolences.  In a phone call with the President on September 12, Jiang reportedly promised
to cooperate with the United States to combat terrorism.  At the U.N. Security Council on the
same day, the PRC (a permanent member) voted with the others for Resolution 1368 (to
combat terrorism). On September 20, Beijing said that it offered “unconditional support” in
fighting terrorism.  On September 20-21, visiting Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan promised
cooperation, and Secretary of State Colin Powell indicated that discussions covered
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intelligence-sharing but not military cooperation.  PRC counter-terrorism experts attended a
“productive” initial meeting on September 25, 2001, in Washington.  On September 28, 2001,
China voted with all others in the U.N. Security Council for Resolution 1373, which included
a reaffirmation of the need to combat terrorism.
PRC promises of support for the U.S. fight against terrorism, however, were qualified
by other initial statements expressing concerns about U.S. military action.  China also  favored
exercising its decision-making authority at the U.N. Security Council, where it has veto
power.  Initial commentary in official PRC media faulted U.S. intelligence and U.S. defense
and foreign policies (including that on missile defense) for the attacks.  On September 18,
2001, in a phone call with British Prime Minister Tony Blair, Jiang said that war against
terrorism required conclusive evidence, specific targets to avoid hurting innocent people,
compliance with the U.N. Charter, and a role for the Security Council.  Also, observers were
appalled at the reported gleeful anti-U.S. reactions in the PRC’s online chat rooms after the
attacks.
In Tokyo, on January 21, 2002, at the conference on reconstruction aid to Afghanistan,
China pledged $1 million, in addition to humanitarian goods worth $3.6 million.  But three
days later, Jiang promised to visiting Afghan interim leader Hamid Karzai additional
reconstruction aid of $150 million spread over four to five years.  Of this $150 million, China
offered $47 million by 2003 and offered $15 million in 2004.2
In 2002, some news articles reported suspicions that China’s military, the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA), supported the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and sold anti-
aircraft missiles and other weapons to Al Qaeda.3  However, Defense Secretary Donald
Rumsfeld told reporters in August 2002, that Afghanistan is “filled with weapons” and that
“you do find things from China, but you find them from country after country after country.”
He added, “a lot of it is quite old and probably not stable.”4
Policy Analysis
The extent of U.S.-China counter-terrorism cooperation has been limited, but the tone
and context of counter-terrorism helped to stabilize -- if not transform -- the bilateral
relationship.  In the short-term, U.S. security policy toward Beijing sought counter-terrorism
cooperation, shifting from issues about weapons proliferation and military maritime safety (in
the wake of the EP-3/F-8 aircraft collision crisis of April 2001).5  Given the mixed state of
bilateral ties after the collision crisis, Beijing’s diplomatic support met much of U.S.
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expectations.  Testifying to Congress in February 2002, Secretary of State Colin Powell
praised Beijing’s diplomatic support, saying “China has helped in the war against terrorism.”6
Concerning other support, including any cooperation by the PLA, the commanders of
the Central and Pacific Commands, Gen. Tommy Franks and Adm. Dennis Blair, separately
confirmed in April 2002 that China did not provide military cooperation (nor was it
requested) in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan (e.g., basing, staging, or
overflight) and that its shared intelligence was not specific enough, particularly as compared
to cooperation from the Philippines, Singapore, and Malaysia.7  The Pentagon’s June 2002
report on foreign contributions in the counter-terrorism war did not include China among
the 50 countries in the coalition.8  In December 2002, Assistant Secretary of State James
Kelly confirmed intelligence-sharing, saying “we are sharing [counter-terrorism]
information to an unprecedented extent but making judgments independently.”9
China’s long-standing relationship with nuclear-armed Pakistan was an important
factor in considering the significance of Beijing’s support, especially with concerns about
the viability of Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf’s government.  Some said that
Pakistan’s cooperation with the United States must come with PRC acquiescence,
pointing to a PRC envoy’s meeting with Musharraf on September 18, 2001.  However,
on September 13, 2001, Musharraf had agreed to fight with the United States against bin
Laden.10  The PRC has reportedly provided Pakistan with nuclear and missile technology.
China could provide intelligence about Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and any suspected
technology transfers out of Pakistan to countries like North Korea, Iran, and Libya.
In the long term, counter-terrorism may hold strategic implications  for the U.S.-PRC
relationship.  It has remained debatable as to whether such cooperation has fundamentally
transformed the bilateral relationship.  Policymakers have watched to see whether Beijing’s
leaders have used the opportunity to improve bilateral ties, especially on weapons
nonproliferation issues.  In his State of the Union speech on January 29, 2002, President Bush
expressed his expectation that “in this moment of opportunity, a common danger is erasing
old rivalries.  America is working with Russia and China and India, in ways we have never
before, to achieve peace and prosperity.”  Nonetheless, Director of Central Intelligence
George Tenet testified to Congress in February 2002, that the 9/11 attacks did not change “the
fundamentals” of China’s approach to us.11
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The PRC’s concerns about domestic terrorism, U.S.-PRC relations, China’s
international standing in a world dominated by U.S. power (particularly after the terrorist
attacks), and its image as a responsible leader helped explain China’s supportive stance.
However, Beijing also worried about U.S. military action near China, U.S.-led alliances,
Japan’s active role in the war (as quickly promised by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi),
greater U.S. (and Russian) influence in Central and South Asia at PRC expense, and U.S.
support for Taiwan --  all exacerbating long-standing fears of “encirclement.”  Under
Jiang Zemin (who remained as Chairman of the Central Military Commission despite
giving up Party leadership at the 16th Party Congress in November 2002), the PRC issued
a new Defense White Paper in December 2002. It said that major powers remained in
competition but that since the September 2001 attacks against the United States, countries
have increased cooperation.  Although this paper contained veiled criticisms of the United
States for its military buildup, stronger alliances in Asia, and increased arms sales to and
enhanced military ties with Taiwan, it did not criticize the United States by name as in the
Defense White Paper of 2000.
Options and Implications for U.S. Policy
Summits and Strategic Ties.  The counter-terrorism campaign helped to
stabilize U.S.-PRC relations up to the highest level, which faced tensions early in the
Bush Administration in April 2001 with the EP-3 aircraft collision crisis and U.S.
approvals of arms sales to Taiwan.  According to the Final Report of the 9/11
Commission issued in July 2004, President Bush chaired a National Security Council
meeting on the night of September 11, 2001, in which he contended that the attacks
provided a “great opportunity” to engage Russia and China.  President Bush traveled to
Shanghai in October 2001 for his first meeting with then PRC President Jiang Zemin at
the Leaders’ Meeting of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum.  Bush
called the PRC an important partner in the global coalition against terrorists but also
warned Jiang that the “war on terrorism must never be an excuse to persecute minorities.”
On February 21-22, 2002, the President visited Beijing (a trip postponed in October), after
Tokyo and Seoul.  The President then hosted Jiang at Bush’s ranch in Crawford, TX, on
October 25, 2002, and Bush said that the two countries are “allies” in fighting terrorism.
FBI Office in Beijing.  On December 6, 2001, Francis Taylor, the State
Department’s Coordinator for Counter-terrorism, ended talks in Beijing that reciprocated
the September 25 meeting in Washington.  He announced that the PRC agreed to give
“positive consideration” to a long-sought U.S. request for the FBI to set up a Legal
Attaché office at the U.S. Embassy, that counter-terrorism consultations would occur
semi-annually, and that the two sides would set up a Financial Counter-Terrorism
Working Group.  He reported that Beijing’s cooperation has entailed coordination at the
U.N., intelligence-sharing, law enforcement liaison, and monitoring of financial
networks.12  The PRC approved the FBI office in February 2002, and the first semi-annual
meeting on terrorist financing was held at the Treasury Department in late May.  The FBI
attaché arrived at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing in September 2002.
Designations as Terrorist Organizations.  Further questions concern the U.S.
stance on the PRC’s policy toward Uighur people from Xinjiang and claims against what it
calls “East Turkistan” terrorist organizations.  Although Taylor confirmed that there are
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“people from western China that are involved in terrorist activities in Afghanistan,” he
rejected the view that “all of the people of western China are indeed terrorists” and urged
Beijing to deal politically with their “legitimate” social and economic challenges and not
through counter-terrorism means.  Taylor also stated that the United States did not agree that
“East Turkestan” forces are terrorists.  He confirmed that the U.S. military captured PRC
citizens from western China who were involved with Al Qaeda in Afghanistan.
Nonetheless, while in Beijing on August 26, 2002, Deputy Secretary of State Richard
Armitage announced that, after months of bilateral discussions, he designated the East
Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) as a terrorist group that committed acts of violence
against unarmed civilians.  China had issued a report on January 21, 2002, saying that “East
Turkestan” terrorist groups have attacked with bin Laden’s support since the 1990s, and
ETIM was one of the groups in the report.  The U.S. Embassy in Beijing suggested that ETIM
planned to attack the U.S. Embassy in Kyrgyzstan.13  The State Department  designated ETIM
as a terrorist organization under Executive Order 13224 (to freeze assets) but not as a Foreign
Terrorist Organization (under the Immigration and Nationality Act).  In December 2002,
Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly defended the action taken against ETIM as a step
based on U.S. evidence that ETIM has links to Al Qaeda and committed violence against
civilians, “not as a concession to the PRC.”14
Detained Uighurs.  A related question pertains to the fate of Uighurs captured
during U.S. fighting with Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, but whom are claimed by the PRC as
its citizens for legal action in China and whom PRC authorities might seek to interrogate.
In May 2004, Amnesty International said that, in 2002, the United States allowed PRC
government personnel to participate in interrogations and mistreatment of ethnic Uighurs
held at the prison at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.  Then, in July 2004, Amnesty International
urged the United States not to turn the 22 detained Uighurs over to China, where they
would face torture and execution in China’s campaign to repress the Uighur people in the
name of “counter-terrorism.”15  Other options include sending them to a third country and
resettling them in the United States.  By 2004, U.S. officials said they determined that the
Uighurs detained at Guantanamo Bay have no more intelligence value, but the United
States cannot find a third country to accept them, while ruling out their return to China.16
In August 2004, Secretary of State Colin Powell confirmed the dilemma, saying that “the
Uighurs are not going back to China, but finding places for them is not a simple matter,
but we are trying to find places for them.”17  The United States has approached Germany,
Switzerland, Finland, Norway, Italy, France, Portugal, Austria, and Turkey.18
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Weapons Proliferation.  In his 2002 State of the Union speech, President Bush
stressed the twin threats of terrorism and weapons proliferation, indicating a strong stance
on proliferation issues with China.  PRC entities have reportedly transferred missile
and/or chemical weapons technology to countries that the State Department says support
terrorism, like Iran, North Korea, and Libya.  On numerous occasions, the Administration
has imposed sanctions for weapons proliferation by PRC entities.  China has not joined
the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) announced by President Bush on May 31, 2003.
In its Final Report issued on July 22, 2004, the 9/11 Commission urged officials to
encourage China to join the PSI.19
Post-Tiananmen Sanctions.  Additional policy options have included selectively
or permanently waiving sanctions imposed after the Tiananmen crackdown (Section 902
of P.L. 101-246), denying exports of defense articles/services, crime control equipment,
and satellites.  On January 9, 2002, the President issued a waiver of those sanctions (to
export a bomb containment and disposal unit for the Shanghai fire department to prevent
terrorist bombings) and again on January 25, 2002 (to consider export licenses for
equipment to clean up chemical weapons in China left by Japan in World War II).
Container Security Initiative (CSI).  The Bush Administration also sought
China’s cooperation in the Container Security Initiative (CSI) of U.S. Customs.  Launched
in January 2002, CSI included PRC ports (Shanghai and Shenzhen) among the top 20
foreign ports proposed for U.S. inspections of containers before U.S.-bound shipping.  On
July 29, 2003, China agreed to join the CSI.  Only after this U.S.-PRC agreement did the
Administration discuss an agreement with Taiwan to cover the last of the 20 ports:
Kaohsiung (ranked fourth behind Hong Kong, Shanghai, and Singapore).
Military-to-Military Contacts.  While there has been no counter-terrorism
cooperation with the PLA, the Pentagon has cautiously resumed military-to-military
contacts with China, limited after the EP-3 crisis and subject to review by Secretary
Rumsfeld.  For the first time under the Bush Administration, the Pentagon and the PLA
again held Defense Consultative Talks (DCT) on December 9, 2002.  There were visits
by China’s Defense Minister, General Cao Gangchuan, in October 2003 and the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Richard Myers, in January 2004. The two militaries
held another DCT round in February 2004.  Congress has oversight of the National
Defense Authorization Act for FY2000 (P.L. 106-65), which limited contacts with the
PLA to prevent its “inappropriate exposure” to operational areas.20
